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The hypothesis that the internal public debt has played the role of shock absorber in 
Colombia since 1923 is modelled. 1923 was an important landmark in the history of 
fiscal and monetary reforms in Colombia during the twentieth century. The econometric 
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This paper seeks to model the hypothesis that the internal public debt (henceforth IPD) 
has played the role of shock absorber in the Colombian economy. The period chosen 
was 1923 – 2003. 1923 was an important landmark in the history of fiscal, monetary 
and other institutional reforms in Colombia during the twentieth century. 
 
We build a model based on the government budget constraint in which the dependent 
variable is the deviation from trend of the IPD. The explanatory variables are shocks on 
the sources of tax revenues (output and imports), shocks on government expenditures, 
and shocks on external financing. These shocks are also modelled as deviations from 
the historical trends. The model shows that when output, imports, government 
expenditure and external financing grow at their historical rate, the IPD grows at the 
rate of the economy.  
 
We follow standard econometric methods for evaluating the estimated model. It is 
shown how the sample period estimation satisfies prevailing criteria regarding statistical 
and economic interpretation of the estimated parameters. Based on the estimation 
results, we describe and historically illustrate the cycles of the IPD during the period of 
study. 
 
We start with a brief reference to relevant economic paradigms which guide our 
interpretation of the econometric estimations.  
 
A. The paradigms. 
 
Despite major analytical differences, three lines of thinking offer a general guidance for 
the empirical work, namely, the Keynesian model of fiscal deficits, the life-cycle 
hypothesis (LCH) with its implications for fiscal policy choices, and the tax-smoothing 
model of deficits. 
 
Regarding the Keynesian model, we refer to the Keynesian-Lernerian principle of 
"functional finance"
3. In this framework, a balanced budget over the business cycle is 
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the outcome of deficit policies during recessions and surplus policies during prosperity. 
The stabilization of the economy is the criterion invoked to assess budgetary policies, 
and taxes and government expenditures are active policy instruments.  
 
As for life-cycle theories, a central concern is the ability of budgetary policies to 
redistribute welfare between generations. In order to preserve a balanced budget over 
the business cycle, life-cycle exponents advocate discretionary and procyclical tax rates. 
What is behind this position is a defence of the principle of intergenerational equity. It 
is asserted that generations benefited by tax reductions during depressions are the same 
who finance increased tax rates and surpluses at high activity levels
4. 
 
The tax-smoothing model argues for cyclically invariant tax rates. Deficits during 
recessions and surpluses during prosperity result from automatic fiscal stabilizers. Fiscal 
deficits during depressions are interpreted as optimal responses of the economic system 
to temporary low-income periods
5. 
 
As seen, the three paradigms favour a balanced budget over the cycle as a whole, but 
fiscal activism or discretionary policies are ingredients of the Keynesian or the life-
cycle prescriptions which do not find room in the tax-smoothing theory. These 
alternative theoretical positions determine the expected coefficients in applied work. 
While the tax-smoothing framework predicts unitary coefficients (in absolute value) for 
changes in public debt due to shocks on output and government expenditures, the other 
two frameworks predict a coefficient greater than one in the case of output, and less 
than one in the case of government expenditures
6.  
 
Our empirical work is different from what is usual in the literature, since instead of 
considering the stock of total debt (or the changes in this variable) as a function of other 
economic variables, we separate out the internal debt from the external debt, and treat 
the former as the dependent variable, and the latter as one of the explanatory variables. 
Essentially, we emphasize the shock absorber role of IPD, and highlight the exogenous 
nature of external financing. 
 
The historical documentation of the Colombian experience reveals that the internal debt 
and the external debt are not perfect substitutes. While the latter is largely determined 
by the cycles of private foreign credit and the availability of developmental loans, the 
former is constrained by limited domestic financial markets and restricted access to the 
credit of the central bank. For years (1923 – 1990), only under exceptional 
circumstances (deep recessions, wars), and after ad hoc parliamentary legislation, would 
the government had access to extraordinary lending from the central bank. Finally, since 
a constitutional reform in 1991, the central bank is not allowed to make loans either to 
the government or to the private sector. These specific aspects of our study do not 
invalidate the applicability of the 'paradigms', however, but extend their application. For 
instance, our model below discusses not only the textbook countercyclical role of the 
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internal public debt concerning output fluctuations, but also its countercyclical function 
regarding shocks on external financing to the economy as a whole. 
 
B. The model. 
 
To begin with, we refer to the government budget constraint as the starting point for our 
discussions on the IPD. 
 
A simple expression for a government budget constraint which discriminates between 
external and internal debt is 
 
dF + dF* = (G - T) + rF + r*F*  
 
where dF and dF* represent the changes in the real stocks of the internal and the 
external debts respectively, (G-T) is the real primary deficit, and r and r* are the real 
interest rates on the internal and the external debts respectively. Regarding tax revenues, 
T, we highlight the crucial historical importance of imports in the tax base. Based on 
those facts we propose to make an explicit differentiation between imports and other 
sources of tax revenues which for simplicity we relate to output. Bearing these 
considerations in mind, a simple two-period government budget constraint can be 
represented as follows: 
 
(Ft-Ft-1) + (F*t-F*t-1) =  
 
rFt-1 + rF*t-1 + Gt - τ(Y+M)t           ( 1 )  
 
where the terms in parentheses on the left-hand side are the changes in the internal and 
the external debts respectively, r is a constant real interest rate applicable to both the 
internal and the external debts, Gt is the real flow of government expenditures exclusive 
of interest payments, and τ is the tax rate equally applied on real output (Y) and real 
imports (M). 
 
Equation (1) gives the change in Ft and F*t between any two equal periods of time. By 
solving this equation forward it is possible to extend the analysis to a finite period (T) or 
to the infinite horizon (T→∞). Assuming for simplicity that the government has an 
infinite time horizon, and imposing the transversality conditions  
 
lim Ft+i/(1+r)
i = 0  
i→∞ 
           ( 2 )  
lim F*t+i/(1+r)
i = 0 
i→∞ 
the intertemporal budget constraint is 
 
  ∞ 
Ft-1 + F*t-1 = ∑ [τ(Y+M)t+i - Gt+i](1+r)
-(i+1)       ( 3 )  
i=0  
 
The two equations in (2) state that neither the stock of internal debt nor the stock of 
external debt grow faster than the interest rate forever. Equation (3) means that the   5
present value of primary fiscal surpluses to be obtained in the infinite horizon is exactly 
equal to the sum of the initial stocks of the internal and the external debts. 
 
The discussion of the government budget constraint can be extended by considering the 
steady-state case in which the variables Yt, Mt and Gt grow all at the same rate, n. The 
actual values of these time series fluctuate around a trend which grows at the common 
rate n. The present values of these series are calculated by using the Gordon model of 
corporate finance (Copeland and Weston, 1988), according to which the present value 
of a series X growing at a constant rate n (assumed to be less than r) is given by  
  ∞ 
X




Therefore, the normal or permanent values for the variables under discussion are as 
follows 
 
  ∞       ∞ 
Y
P
t     =     (r-n)∑Yt+i(1+r)
-(i+1)  G
P
t     =     (r-n)∑Gt+i(1+r)
-(i+1) 
i = 0        i = 0  
 
(4) 
      ∞ 
M
P
t     =     (r-n)∑Mt+i(1+r)
-(i+1) 
  i=0 
 
 





Pt from (4) into (3), the 
intertemporal budget constraint can be rewritten as 
 
 






t]/(r-n)        (5) 
 
 
Now, by substituting from (5) into (1) where we have previously added and subtracted 
the same amounts nFt-1 and nF*t-1 leads to the following expression for the two-period 
government budget constraint: 
 
 
(Ft-Ft-1)  +  (F*t-F*t-1) = 
 
τ(Y
P-Y)t  +  τ(M
P-M)t  +  (G-G




P-X) terms represent shocks on the corresponding variables. The shocks on 
Yt and Mt appear weighted by τ, thus giving the deviations of Yt and Mt from their trend 
values as a proportion of the normal amount of revenues.  
 
At this point we can introduce some rearrangements and modifications which will prove 
useful in our empirical analysis. First we can rewrite the government budget identity in 
terms of the IPD as follows:   6
 
 
[Ft-(1 + n)Ft-1] =  
 
τ(Y
P-Y)t  +  τ(M
P-M)t  +  (G-G
P)t  -  [F*t - (1 + n)F*t-1]     (7) 
 
 
Since n is a constant growth rate, the presence of n on the left-hand side represents a 
single increment of the internal debt at rate n. The same applies to the external debt on 
the right-hand side. Then, equation (7) shows that in the absence of shocks on output, 
imports, and government expenditures, and provided that the external debt does not 
grow at a rate different from n, the IPD will grow at the trend growth rate of the 
economy [Ft = (1+n)Ft-1]. Second, since we are interested in the analysis of a period of 
eighty years, instead of a single increment between two periods, it is convenient to 
apply a constant rate of continuous compounding to the variables Ft and F*t; these 
constant rates are the corresponding trend growth rates of Ft and F*t. Therefore, (7) may 






P)t  -  (F*-F*~)t     (8) 
 
 
where F~ and F*~ stand for the trend values of F and F*. Equation (8) is the basis of our 
empirical analysis. The terms (X-X
P) result from the detrending process of each variable 
in (8). Such a process is explained in Appendix A. The same applies to the terms (F-F~) 
and (F*-F*~). The next step is to formulate an estimating equation for the model in (8). 
This is what we do in the following subsection.  
 
 
C. Empirical analysis. 
 
 
The empirical equation to be applied to annual observations over the period 1925-2003 
is 
 
Fut = a0Fut-1 + a1Yut + a2Mut + a3Gut + a4f'ut + K + et     (9) 
(+)     (-)        (-)       (+)       (-) 
 
The dependent variable Fut represents estimated deviations from trend of the IPD. 
Similarly, the explanatory variables are also estimated deviations from trend of the 
corresponding variables. All the variables are in logarithms with the exception of f'ut 
(estimated innovations for external financing scaled by exports) because this series is 
sometimes negative. K is a dummy variable. As seen in Figure 1a below, the series 
increases substantially and suddenly in 1962, and also in 1983. The reasons for these 
big changes were institutional. In 1962 the central bank incurred in heavy losses in the 
foreign exchange market, and the government accepted to incorporate them as part of its 
public debt. At the beginning of 1983, as part of a package of fiscal reforms, the 
government decided to resign to some revenues which came from a Special Foreign 
Exchange Account. Such a reduction in fiscal incomes was compensated by 
extraordinary loans of the central bank to the government. And, et is an error term.   7
 
The time paths of the regressand and regressors in equation (9) are described by 
individual graphs in Figure 1. The evolution of Fut appears in Figure 1.a. The original 
series corresponds to the year-end nominal stocks of the IPD between 1925 and 2003. 
The real values of the series were obtained by using the GDP deflator. The evolution of 
Yut is shown in Figure 1.b. The original series is the annual values of GDP in real 
terms. The time path of Mut appears in Figure 1.c. The original series is the year-end 
values of real imports in US$. The time path of Gut is depicted in Figure 1.d. The 
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Sources: CEPAL (1957) for the original data from 1925 up to 1957. And DANE for the original data up 
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Sources. Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva del Banco de la República (annual), from 1924 up to 
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Sources: Informe Financiero del Contralor (Contraloría General de la República, annual) for the original 




The time path of f'ut is portrayed in Figure 1.e. The flow of external financing f' 
includes not only the flow of foreign lending to the national government dF* (which we 
used in our discussion of the government budget constraint, above), but also foreign 
lending to the rest of the public sector and the private sector; these concepts are net of 
interest repayments abroad. Additionally, f' includes the flow of foreign direct 
investment. In our estimating equation (9) we use this concept of f' rather than a   9
narrower one which only includes the foreign lending to the national government. The 
reason for this choice is that, it is the collapse of net foreign financing to the country, 
and not only to the national government, which encourages the reaction of the IPD. 
 
1. Expected signs. 
 
Consider first positive (negative) shocks on GDP which lead this variable to grow above 
(below) its trend. The IPD is expected to grow below (above) its trend, and therefore the 
expected sign is negative. A similar consideration can be made regarding shocks on 
imports, since custom revenues have been of critical importance in the composition of 
total tax revenues. The IPD is expected to grow below (above) its trend when imports 
grow above (below) their own trend, and thus the expected sign is negative. Regarding 
government expenditures, it is expected that temporary deviations from trend will cause 
the IPD to deviate from trend in the same direction, and therefore the hypothesized sign 
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Notes. Net External Financing is defined as (dIR – TB)/X, where dIR: change in international reserves; 
TB: trade balance; and X: exports. 
Sources. Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva del Banco de la República (annual), form 1924 up to 
1985. Since then Revista del Banco de la República (monthly publication). 
 
 
The term aoFut-1 accounts for lagged effects of the growth rate of internal debt. We 
expect that the current deviation of internal debt from trend should be a positive 
function of its lagged value. Figure 1.a.brings out a notable persistence of periods in 
which internal debt grows above its trend. We explain this behaviour as a result of 
institutional factors associated with the maturity structure of the IPD. Historically, after 
episodes of extraordinary increases of the internal debt (particularly in the 1930s and 
1980s) governments transformed their substantially enlarged short-term financial 
obligations into long-term liabilities. 
 
Finally consider the term a4f'ut. The IPD is expected to grow above (below) its trend, 
whenever the flow of net external financing to the country grows below (above) its 
trend. This hypothesized relationship is derived from the fact that governments resort to   10
internal financing to cushion the impact of changes in external financing on the 
economy. The proposed sign is negative. 
 
2. Expected coefficients. 
 
How can we interpret the coefficients in equation (9)? As for the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable ao, the expected coefficient is strictly greater than zero, and 
strictly less than one. ao is expected to say what percentage of the lagged deviation from 
trend of the IPD in a given period persists to the next period. Regarding the output's 
innovations coefficient a1, consider the case in which tax revenues T depend on a 
proportional income tax and a constant tax rate (T=t~Y). When only built-in fiscal 
stabilizers are at work, and the deficit is only financed with internal debt, the 
hypothesized coefficient is a1=1. This is the magnitude of a1 postulated by the tax-
smoothing theory. Alternatively, when automatic stabilization is reinforced by 
procyclical changes in tax rates the expected coefficient is a1>1.0. Finally, a coefficient 
a1<1 cannot be discarded if in the event of automatic stabilization part of the deficit is 
financed with external debt; if this is the case, although tax smoothing applies, the 
model cannot be informative about that result. 
 
The discussion of the expected magnitude of a2 is somewhat more complicated. 
Governments alter tariffs not only for fiscal purposes. There may exist protectionism 
and/or balance-of- payments reasons for changing tariffs' levels. These reasons could be 
put forward regardless of whether imports are growing at their normal rate or above or 
below that rate. In general, revisions of tariffs seek to satisfy a combination of interests; 
for instance, protectionism and fiscal revenues. Some possibilities can be described in 
order to postulate expected magnitudes of a2. The simplest case is that in which given a 
constant tariff, collected duties rise (fall) when imports grow at a higher (lower) rate 
than their normal. This is a tax-smoothing case which yields a2=1; the important 
assumption is that for instance in the case of a fall in collected duties the government 
does not have access to or does not use external credit to finance the emergent deficit. 
 
A second possible case postulates a2<1. Two options may be considered. One is the 
illustration just given in which the tariff level is kept constant regardless of positive or 
negative cycles of imports; the difference is that in this instance governments finance 
part of the ensuing deficit (when duty revenues fall) with external credit and the 
remainder with internal debt. The final effect is tax smoothing, though the model itself 
cannot inform about that result. The model only shows the direct response of internal 
debt to shortfalls in imports. The alternative option considers a mixture of increasing 
internal debt and higher tariff levels, and possibly some external financing. To sum up, 
a coefficient a2<1 indicates that a hypothetical negative fiscal effect of a downturn in 
imports is partly financed by an increase in internal financing but is inconclusive about 
the behaviour of tariffs.  
 
Under a tax-smoothing framework, governments use public debt to finance temporary 
and unexpectedly high expenditures. A coefficient a3=1 is expected under the 
assumption that governments avoid affecting tax rates during emergency periods and 
finance the upsurge of temporary expenses with an increased internal debt. A coefficient 
a3<1 indicates that only a fraction of positive cycles in government expenses is financed 
by increases of internal debt. But once more the model is inconclusive about tax   11
smoothing; governments could avoid changing tax rates by using a combination of 
internal and external credit. 
 
Regarding the coefficient a4 we hypothesize a coefficient less than 1. The reasons for 
expecting a4<1 are not based on theoretical considerations but on historical experience. 
In other place, we have emphasized the temporary and partial character of important 
increases in internal debt in response to sudden reductions in external financing. Then 
the proposed coefficient is a4<1
7. 
 
To sum up, our empirical model inquires into the causes of deviations of internal debt 
from its historical trend. Shocks on output, imports, government expenditures and 
external financing are explanatory variables. The hypothesized magnitude of the 
coefficients a1=a2=a3=1 corresponds to one of our paradigms, the tax-smoothing theory. 
Were the estimated parameters (a1, a2, a3) close to 1, the evidence would favour that 
approach. However, by specification the model fails to recognize other possibilities of 
tax smoothing since estimated parameters such as a2<1 and a3<1 could be consistent 
with the actual validity of that framework. Finally, the inclusion of the once-lagged 
dependent variable within the explanatory variables suggests that not only shocks on the 
economic variables (Y, M, G, f'), but also institutional factors associated with the way 
governments affect the maturity structure of the IPD cause internal financing to deviate 
from its historical trend.  
 
 
D. Estimation and tests. 
 
 
As seen in Table 1, the processes for all the variables in the estimating equation (9) are 
evaluated in terms of stationarity. The Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) and the 
Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmidt-Shin Test (KPSS) are applied. The stationarity of Yut is 





Unit Root Tests 
 
Variables in the model for the shock-absorber role of the internal public debt 
 
  Augmented 
















Fut  Intercept  τ = -3.071  -2.899  Intercept  0.087  0.739 
Gut  Intercept  τ = -4.586  -2.900  Intercept  0.158  0.216 
Mut  Intercept  τ = -3.089  -2.898  Intercept  0.049  0.739 
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Yut 
Trend and 
Intercept  τ = -1.207  -3.469  Trend and Intercept  0.162  0.216 
f ‘ut 
Trend and 
Intercept  τ = -4.618  -2.899  Trend and Intercept  0.060  0.216 
Notes. In the case of the ADF Test, the deterministic component was chosen according to the sequential 
process suggested by Perron (1988). The Schwarz Information Criterion was applied in selecting the 
optimal lag length of the test regression. In the case of the KPSS test, the spectral estimation applied was 
the Bartlett kernel method.  The bandwidth was selected according to the Newey-West criterion.  
Software. EViews 5. 
 
The results in Table 1 allow us to apply classical OLS as method of econometric 









Dependent Variable: RLORIPD 
Estimation Method: OLS 
Simple: 1926 2003 
No. obs.: 78 
 
Regressors Coefficient. S.  E.  t-Stat. Prob. 
Fut-1  0.798734 0.053729  14.86610  0.0000 
Yut  -1.658977 0.415439  -3.993311  0.0002 
Gut  0.324381 0.141431  2.293557  0.0247 
Mut  -0.222458 0.091686  -2.426296  0.0178 
f ´ut  -0.124366 0.129920  -0.957253  0.3416 
K  0.832404 0.144445  5.762771  0.0000 
R-squared  0.907457  Mean dependent var  0.008986 
Adjusted R-squared  0.9010313  S.D. dependent var  0.627420 
S.E. of regresión  0.0.197383  Akaike info criterion  -0.333541 
Sum squared resid  2.805116  Schwarz criterion  -0.152256 
       
       
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: s1(n)  
F-statistic  2.839782     Probability  0.065190
Obs*R-squared  5.848465     Probability  0.053706
ARCH Test:       
F-statistic  0.249582     Probability  0.618832
Obs*R-squared  0.255387     Probability  0.613307
White Heteroskedasticity Test:   
F-statistic 2.097872       Probability  0.0137106  13
Obs*R-squared  35.58907     Probability  0.033589
Jarque-Bera: 1.844 Valor-p:  0.3976 
 
Software. EViews 5 
 
 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates for the full sample 1925-2003. The estimated shocks 
associated with output, government spending, imports and external financing exhibit the 
expected signs and are all, but the last one, significant at the 5% level. First of all, the 
estimated coefficient of the Yut variable (-1.6, t-statistics: -4.0) reveals a strong 
countercyclical reaction of IPD to downswings in real GDP. Literally, a negative 
deviation of the growth rate of output of 1% relative to its historical trend causes 
internal financing to grow at 1.6% above its normal rate. As for shocks on government 
expenditures, the estimated coefficient indicates that a deviation of the growth rate of 
the IPD of 0.3% above its trend corresponds to an increase of the growth rate of 
government expenditures of 1% above their trend. Regarding negative shocks on 
imports and external financing, the estimates reveal also counteractive responses of 
internal debt. Finally, the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is 
highly significant and shows a marked sluggish adjustment of the internal debt. 
 
What can we say about theory consistency?  
 
Two issues are to be considered: the economic interpretation and the statistical 
characteristics of the estimates in Table 2. As for the economic interpretation we have 
already observed that the estimated parameters of the hypothesized explanatory 
variables are all but one significant, and the signs are as expected. The estimated value 
for a1 indicates that the typical countercyclical reaction of internal debt notably exceeds 
the unitary coefficient which will correspond to automatic stabilization; by referring to 
our paradigms, this result suggests the presence of discretionary countercyclical 
measures beyond the operation of automatic stabilizers. Additionally, the coefficients' 
sizes imply that internal debt is used to finance only a portion of deficits arising due to 
either negative cycles of imports or huge temporary government expenses, but we are 
unable to conclude about the possibility of tax smoothing in these cases. 
 
It is shown how the estimated value for a4 supports the conjectured countercyclical and 
partial reaction of internal debt to shocks on external financing. Certainly, the estimated 
value for a4 is not significant according to standard criteria. When regressions are 
performed for samples up to 1990, a4 is clearly significant. Additionally, documental 
reports about fiscal policy illustrate how authorities had to recourse to IPD whenever 
they had to face the cycles of external financing. Having these considerations in mind, 
we decide to maintain the external financing as part of the set of regressors. 
 
As for the statistical characteristics of the estimation, Table 2 also offers various criteria 
for evaluating our econometric model. First of all, the goodness-of-fit suggested by 
Figure 2 is confirmed by a high R
2. Additionally, two sets of diagnostic tests insinuate 
the absence of a systematic lack-of-fit. These tests check for the presence of serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. s1(n) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for 
autocorrelation in its F-version
8. h1(n) is the Autoregressive Conditional 
                                                 
8/  The LM test (Box and Pierce [1970] and Godfrey [1978] is computed by regressing the OLS 
residuals e^t on all the regressors of the original model xt and the lagged residuals for lags up to n (e^t-1,   14
Heteroskedasticity test ARCH presented here in its F form, and h2(n) is the test for 
heteroskedasticity due to squares of the regressors also in its F-form
9. The results show 
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NOTES. Fitted values: annual estimates of the deviations from trend of the real internal public debt 
according to the model in equation (9). 
SOURCES. Informe Financiero del Contralor for the original annual data on nominal IPD, and DANE for 
the annual GDP deflator. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the time path of the residuals resulting from the OLS estimation of 
equation (9).  
 
Figure 3 
                                                                                                                                               
…, e^t-n). The test statistic s1(n) is T (observations) times the R
2 for this regression. Kiviet (1986) finds 
that this version of the test has poor small sample properties and recommends the Lagrange Multiplier 
type F-test which seems to be invariant to sample size and redundant regressors. 
9  Engle (1982) proposes a test for heterokedasticity  (the ARCH test) in which the e^
2
t are 
regressed on their lagged values. The test checks for the significance of the estimated parameters. The 
h2(n) test proposed by White (1980) is computed by regressing the e^
2
t on the regressors of the original 
model xt and their corresponding squares x
2
t. The null of homoscedasticity  is tested against the 
alternative that the variance of the et is a function of xt and x
2t. The test is also a general test for model 
specification. If the test is not statistically significant it implies that not only the variance specification of 
the model is correct, but also that the linear specification is correct. (White [1980] p. 823)   15
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NOTES. Series of estimated residuals obtained from the OLS regression of the model in equation (9). 
SOURCES. As in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3 suggests that the series is not afflicted by serial correlation or 
heteroskedasticity. A few extreme values are observed, particularly in 1983, but above 
all in 1962. So far our tests have not been affected by these unusually large values; such 
is the case of the normality test which by construction is sensitive to outliers. Finally, as 
expected from the stationarity of the regressand and regressors the estimated residuals 
are also stationary. 
 
What can we add about parameter constancy? The point is important not only because 
the lack of regression parameter constancy is a cause of misspecification of estimating 
equations, but because it has to be shown that although the economic system 
experienced changes over the period of study, the model is characterized by parameters 
which remained fairly stable. In order to check for parameter constancy we reestimate 
the model by using recursive least squares (RLS). This estimation provides us with new 
diagnostic tools, namely, the RLS coefficients, and various Chow statistics, to which 
results we now turn. 
 
The RLS coefficients allow us to follow the time paths of the parameters of the model 
over the period of study. The coefficients for f'ut and Fut-1 are very stable over the 
sample period. The coefficient for Gut remains relatively stable over the period, and the 
same happens for the coefficients on Mut and Yut. The CUSUM test (based on the 
cumulative sum of the recursive residuals) and the CUSUM of squares test are also 
suggestive of parameter stability. To sum up, the recursive estimation of (9) shows that 
all the parameters are stable. An additional source of information about stability is 
provided by the Chow test. The test was performed annually between 1963 and 1983. 
The results reported parameter constancy over that period. 
 
Finally, a common characteristic of all the regressions is the relatively high and strong 
significance of the estimate of the lagged value of the dependent variable. It reveals that 
an important feature in this historical analysis is the tendency to a slow adjustment of 
internal debt. Putting it other way, not only cycles in economic variables but the pace at   16
which the government amortizes the outstanding internal debt explains the cycles in 
internal financing. Various historical episodes endorse this statistical finding. For 
example, the extraordinary increase of internal public debt of the early 1930s, required 
four decades to be fully amortized. 
 
Having interpreted our econometric estimations, we now turn to describe the evolution 
of the cycles of IPD (Figure 2) in the light of the cycles of the explanatory variables and 
the estimates reported in Table 2. 
 
 
E. Behaviour of the cycles of the internal public debt, 1925-2003. 
 
 
Graph 2 and Table 2 suggest that we can distinguish three main periods in the predicted 
time path of the cycles of IPD. 
 
1. Mid-1920s to mid-1950s 
 
Three phases can be observed during the first period: the second half of the 1920s which 
mostly coincides with the boom which precedes the great depression (1929-33); from 
the depression years to WWII; and the first post-War decade.  
 
The first phase was dominated by a deep negative cycle of internal debt around its trend. 
The reasons for this negative cycle are to be found in the behaviour of output, imports, 
and external financing, all of which experienced growth rates notably above their trends. 
1928 is a crucial date in the evolution of the series: output and imports reach their 
maximum positive deviations from trend ever, and external financing arrives at a point 
which could only be repeated towards the other extreme of the series in 1981. 1928 is 
also the year in which government expenditures reach their maximum growth rate above 
normal for the whole series (1925-2003); coeteris paribus, this behaviour of government 
expenditure contradicts our expectation of a positive relationship between Fut and Gut. 
 
After 1928 the deluge: the access to external credit is virtually closed, imports fall 
sharply after 1929 and output slows down to achieve just its historical rate in 1931. As a 
result of these events, the deep negative cycle of IPD is transformed into a large positive 
cycle since 1931. This cycle reaches its maximum in 1933 and also high points in 1942-
1945. What can we say about the behaviour of the individual explanatory variables 
which resulted in the positive cycle of the IPD? Note first the evolution of output. 
Along the 1930s output grows above its historical rate, with an average deviation from 
trend of 2%, lower than the average of 10% which predominated in the second half of 
the 1920s. In contrast, during the 1940s output grows below the historical rate, reaching 
during the War years the mayor negative deviations from trend for the whole period 
1925- 2003. 
 
Contrasting with the evolution of output, imports grow at less than their trend since 
1930 and through the end of World War II. Two subperiods can be distinguished. The 
first starts with the great depression when the imports-growth rate collapsed from being 
on average 60% above trend in 1927-28 to being on average 65% below trend in 1931-
1933. The end of this first subperiod coincides with a gradual recovery of imports which 
in the years 1937-39 regained the normal growth rate. The second downfall of imports   17
exactly corresponds with the World War II years. Once more, the average negative 
deviation from trend is 60% in the interval 1942-1944.  
  
The behaviour of external financing between 1930 and 1942 adds new elements to the 
previous description. The boom of the late 1920s is abruptly replaced by the deepest 
downturn during the whole period, between 1930 and 1934; at its bottom in 1931 the 
growth rate of external financing represents a deviation of 57% from the normal growth 
rate. The magnitude of the collapse can be illustrated by the fact that the lowest growth 
rate is achieved only two years after the second highest growth rate of the series is 
reached; at this last point the positive deviation from normal is 49%. Towards the end of 
the decade external financing grows close to, but still below its trend. A different 
experience is to come about during the last three years of the War, however. The 
collapse of imports due to the hostilities, and unexpected capital inflows result in 
accumulating international reserves, and growth rates of external financing above trend; 
at its summit in 1945, these rates represent a positive deviation of 28% over the 
historical growth rate.  
 
As for government expenditures, their behaviour appears to be dominated by policies of 
fiscal retrenchment since the late 1920s through the 1940s. The consequence of these 
policies is a long negative cycle of government expenditures around its trend, of which 
the following figures are illustrative. The average negative deviation from the normal 
growth rate in the years 1935-1938 is 19%. Thereafter, this restrictive behaviour reaches 
an average of 32% in 1943-1946, with a trough of 56% in 1943. Some isolated points 
reveal expansionary increases of government expenditures above normal, but there is 




Finally, some institutional facts appear to be influencing the positive cycles of internal 
public debt. These facts are summarized by the behaviour of Fut-1. Two important 
government decisions are worth noting here. First, the suspension of amortizations on 
the internal debt bonds between 1933 and 1940; and second, the conversion of medium-
term credits granted to the government during the fiscal crisis of the early 1930s into 
long-term internal debt (An important credit received by the government from the 
central bank in 1931 was converted in 1942 into a debt which would be gradually 
amortized along the next 30 years). These facts contribute to a very slow adjustment of 
internal debt. 
 
In conclusion, the individual behaviour of the explanatory variables during the second 
phase can be summarized as follows: imports consistently grow below their trend, thus 
clearly contributing to the positive cycle of the IPD. A less consistent behaviour is 
observed in the evolution of external financing and output. An apparent contrast is 
offered by the evolution of government expenditures which grow below their normal 
rate through the whole phase. Finally, the lagged value of the deviations from trend of 
the IPD seems to contribute to the permanence of the positive cycle of the internal 
public debt under discussion. 
 
The third phase covers the first decade after World War II. During these years the 
growth rates (actual and predicted) of IPD continuously decline, reaching the historical 
                                                 
10/  The increase of government expenditures during 1933 was associated with recovery policies 
implemented after the Great Depression, and the financing of a war with a neighbouring country, Perú.   18
rate in 1950, and then, lower rates than normal during the first half of the 1950s. 
Regarding the behaviour of individual explanatory variables, it appears that while 
output and external financing grow below their trends, and government expenditures 
grow above their trend (altogether suggesting that the growth rates of the internal debt 
could be increasing), imports grow well above their trend. The imports boom triggered 
by the normalization of international trade at the end of the conflict, reaches its height in 
the period 1953-1956 when the average deviation of the growth rate of imports above 
trend equals 58%. As for government expenditures, it has to be noted that for the first 
time in twenty years their growth rates exceed the historical rate. In fact, the fiscal 
bonanza derived from the imports upsurge facilitates the increased government 
spending and allows internal debt to grow at a slower rate compared with the normal.  
 
2. Mid-1950s to mid-1980s 
 
Two phases stand out during these years. A new positive cycle of the IPD starting in the 
early 1960s to the mid-1970s and the period 1975-1985 which largely duplicates the 
experience with IPD in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The first phase is characterized 
by the following features: First, a negative cycle of imports which coincides with a 
negative cycle of world coffee prices. The second feature is a positive cycle of 
government spending particularly between 1967 and 1975, which reaches its peak in 
1972, the second highest point in the whole series of government spending.  
 
Third, as observed the evolution of output can be divided into two different subperiods. 
The first covers the years 1960-1968 when output grows at a steady rate of about 3% 
less than the trend. In the second period (1968-1975) output growth rates evolve 
consistently above trend, reaching levels not achieved before since the economic boom 
of the 1920s. Fourth, the external financing exhibits a series of no negligible ups and 
downs around the trend, which gives an impression of the financial instability of the 
period. On average, the external financing grows below trend. As a whole, with the only 
exception of output during 1968-75, the behaviour of the explanatory variables 
individually considered is consistent with the positive cycle of the internal public debt.  
 
Why does the growth rate of IPD "jump" in 1962 as shown in Figure 2? 1962 was 
already an important reference in our previous discussion of parameter constancy. The 
outstanding change in the internal debt is produced by a combination of economic and 
institutional facts at the center of which there are substantial losses made by the central 
bank in the foreign exchange market which are transformed into internal debt. There are 
also other institutional facts which contribute to the "jump" in 1962 and which reappear 
later during the 1960s and early 1970s; such is the case of substitutions of internal debt 
for part of the external debt. It is as a result of these facts and the commented evolution 
of the economic explanatory variables, that the wave of increasing internal debt of the 
early 1960s extends its existence until the mid-1970s. 
 
The second phase covers the last decade of our period of study. To an important extent 
the 1975-1985 period resembles the boom-and-bust cycles of the late twenties and early 
thirties. Two distinct features of the boom are the coffee bonanza of the years 1976-
1980, and the access to external financing (1979-1982) on a scale not seen in the 
previous fifty years. In this context, a negative cycle of real IPD emerges and its deepest 
point in 1981 corresponds to the actual maximum negative deviation from trend in the 
whole period. This is only an ephemeral experience, however. The end of the temporary   19
boom of the external sector and particularly the sudden and abrupt collapse of external 
financing in 1982 brings about a new cycle of accumulating internal debt. 
 
In the light of our explanatory variables how can we explain the negative cycle of IPD 
during 1975-1981? First, we note that the positive cycle of government spending which 
started in the mid-1960s comes to an end after fiscal reforms implemented in 1975. 
Second, output and imports grow at rates superior to their normal ones: the average 
positive deviation of output from trend in the years 1978-1980 is just somewhat inferior 
to that achieved in the boom of the late 1920s; as for imports, the new positive cycle 
though important and prolonged for six years, does not achieve the magnitudes of the 
twenties or the sixties. The scene is completed with the behaviour of external financing 
whose positive cycle echoes the experience of the late 1920s; its average positive 
deviation from trend in the years 1979-1982 equals 34% compared with 40% in 1926-
1928. The sharp increase in foreign financing since 1979 reaches its summit in 1981, 
which is at the same time the maximum positive deviation from trend of the whole 
series. Altogether, the large positive cycles of external financing and output contribute 
to explain the deep negative cycle of IPD during 1975-1981. This contribution is 
supplemented by a positive cycle of imports and by a negative cycle of government 
expenditures, although in the last case only until 1978. 
 
If the interval 1975-1981 parallels some episodes of the 1920s, the crisis which 
explodes in 1982 reproduces experiences lived through in the early 1930s and leads to a 
new cycle of IPD growing above the historical trend. The economy already affected by 
the recessionary effects of the end of the coffee bonanza faces the breakdown of foreign 
lending in 1982. This crisis, however, is not as deep, prolonged and dramatic as its 
precedent of the 1930s which included an "official debt default". Following the 
downturn of external lending, a new negative cycle of foreign financing emerges: 
during 1983-1985 its average negative deviation from trend reached 18% compared 
with the average positive deviation of 34% achieved during the booming period 1979-
1982. The lesser magnitude of the falldown of external financing in 1983-85 compared 
with that of 1930-1932 is illustrated by the fact that the average negative deviation from 
trend in the latter period was 44%, far greater than the 18% of the former period. 
 
Also negative cycles of output (since 1982) and imports (since 1983) appear after the 
end of the coffee bonanza and the drying up of foreign credit. Altogether, the individual 
behaviour of f'ut, Yut and Mut contribute to explain the new positive cycle of IPD. 
Regarding the behaviour of Gut, the experience of the late 1920s and early 1930s is 
repeated here. A positive cycle of government expenditures during 1979-1984 coincides 
with the negative cycle of IPD during most of that period. In the late 1920s the positive 
cycle of government expenditures was largely financed by a positive cycle of tax 
revenues derived from booming output and imports. In the early 1980s the positive 
wave of government expenditures was mostly financed by financial proceeds obtained 
by the government from the investment and management of the unprecedented stock of 
international reserves left by the coffee bonanza of 1976-1980. 
 
3. Mid-1980 to 2003. 
 
The last twenty years of the series under scrutiny reveal the succession of two phases. 
The first one corresponds to the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, 
when IPD was falling to its steady state. It was a period of fiscal adjustment, with public   20
spending growing at a rate below the historical one, and output growing above the 
normal. Along the last eight years of the sample, IPD grows continuously reaching its 
highest point in the whole series, around 2002. In the background, government spending 
was increasing above its historical standard, real imports were also falling, and external 
financing collapsed after booming between 1992 and 1996. 
 
1991 is an outstanding point in the institutional history of IPD. As part of a thorough 
constitutional reform, the central bank was given a new role, and the monetary 
financing of the budget deficit was tightly restricted. Only with the unanimous vote of 
the monetary board could the government have direct access to loans of the central 
bank. In the past, Congress could create credit lines in the central bank in favor of the 
government. That possibility was abolished. It was also banned the access of the private 
sector to central bank’s loans. As from 1991, the sources of IPD should be the internal 
markets for government bonds, and commercial banks for short-term credits. Since 
1999 the Banco de la República has performed Open Market Operations intervening in 
the market of IPD bonds. 
 
As seen in Figure 1a. and also in Figure 2, the experience with the cycle of IPD since 
1992 has resembled the experience of the 1920s and early 1930s. In the 1930s the 
upsurge of IPD was clearly determined by the reflationary policies implemented in the 
midst of the great depression. At that time the indebtedness with the central bank was a 
crucial component of the cycle of IPD. Things have been different since the early 1990s. 
Governments have floated bonds in internal capital markets in a rather unusual way. 
Contrary to the experience of the 1930s, when the expansionary policies financed by the 
IPD were followed by policies of drastic fiscal adjustment, in the 1990s the positive 
cycle of IPD has not been followed by fiscal retrenchment in a comparable way with 






In this essay we formalized our historically-based hypothesis of the shock-absorber role 
of IPD. By starting from the government budget constraint we derived a model 
according to which IPD deviates from its historical growth rate due to shocks on a set of 
hypothesized explanatory variables. In the absence of these shocks, the IPD grows at its 
historical rate. 
 
According to the empirical results, shocks on the explanatory variables are significant 
and exhibit the expected signs. Overall, all the estimations satisfy standard criteria for 
evaluation of econometric models.  
 
Regarding the theoretical paradigms recalled at the beginning of the paper, the 
estimation applied to the entire period of study suggests that the Colombian experience 
is better represented by paradigms which recognize the role of discretionary 
countercyclical policies over the business cycle. This finding is mainly associated with 
the significant estimated parameter for the output variable which turned out to be far 
greater than unity. Unfortunately, the specification of the model did not allow us to 
derive more explicit conclusions about the relevance of individual paradigms for the 
interpretation of the Colombian case.   21
 
To sum up, our statistical results offer an encouraging support to the hypothesis that 
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Table A. 1 
Summary of Unit Root Tests 
Original variables of the estimating model in logs 
 
 
  Augmented 
















Trend and Intercept  0.094  0.216  Real Internal 
Public Debt 
None  τ = -2.376  -1.945 





Intercept  τ = -4.614  -3.470  Trend and Intercept  0.158  0.216 
Real Imports  None  τ = -0.657  -1.944  Intercept  1.134  0.739 
Real Output 
Trend and 




Intercept  τ = -4.659  -3.467  Trend and Intercept  0.062  0.216 
Notes: In the case of the ADF Test, the deterministic component was chosen according to the sequential 
process suggested by Perron (1988). The Schwarz Information Criterion was used in selecting the optimal 
lag length of test regression. In the case of the KPSS test, the spectral estimation method used was 
Bartlett kernel, and the bandwidth was selected according to Newey-West criterion.  
 
 
Because the Real Imports variable does not pass the previous tests, and after 
observation of the evolution of the series, we perform a Perron’s unit root test for the 









Dependent Variable: LORUSIM 
Estimation Method: OLS 
Sample : 1928 2004                                                
Included observations: 77  
Type of model: Changing growth model, structural break in year 1945 
 
Variable Coef.  S.  E. t-Stat.  Prob. 
C  -0.627862 0.140245  -4.476909  0.0000   23
DU  0.163167 0.114113  1.429875  0.1572 
@TREND  0.015224 0.008521  1.786565  0.0783 
DT*  -0.001732 0.009136  -0.189568  0.8502 
LORUSIM(-1)  0.568542 0.086883  6.543787  0.0000 
D(LORUSIM(-1))  0.245380 0.106916  2.295063  0.0247 
D(LORUSIM(-2))  0.314095 0.109112  2.878650  0.0053 
  
R-squared  0.958418      Mean dependent var  0.189143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.954854      S.D. dependent var  0.879663 
S.E. of regression  0.186908      Akaike info criterion  -0.429892 
Sum squared resid  2.445423      Schwarz criterion  -0.216819 
Log likelihood  23.55084      F-statistic  268.9020 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.955252      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Notes:  Unit root test regression suggested by Perron (1989) allowing for a one-time shift in trend. DU is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the moment of the structural break (1945) and zero 
otherwise. DT* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1,2,3,4,… after the moment of the structural 
break and zero otherwise. LORUSIM es el logaritmo de las importaciones reales en dólares. 
 
 

























According to the Table V.B. in page 1377 of Perron (1989), critical values for this test 
are between -3.80 and -3.87. In either case, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the 
alternative of stationarity around a breaking trend.  
 
Because all the series are stationary at least with one unit root test, each one of them has 
been detrended by means of the OLS estimation of a linear trend
11. The residuals of this 
detrending procedure have been used in the estimation of the model. As Table 1 puts 
forward, the residuals are also stationary according to both ADF and KPSS test, 
excepting the residuals of LORGDP which are stationary under the KPSS unit root test.  
 
 
                                                 
11 The LORUSIM series has been detrended taking into account the presence of a structural shift in the 
trend in 1945.  